By: Adinda Khaerani Epstein, Adjunct Fellow

Indonesia, the fourth most populous nation in the world, the third largest democracy, held its general election on 14 February 2024, marking the fifth round of presidential and legislative elections in the nation’s democratic era. The country is known as a diverse archipelago with some 300 ethnic groups and a population size that stood at 278.696 million in 2023.

The democracy isn’t without challenges and complications.

The declared winner, Prabowo Subianto, received 58.58% of the votes cast. Prabowo, a former army general, was a two-time contender in previous presidential elections. He lost both times to Joko Widodo, popularly known as “Jokowi,” before joining the victor’s cabinet as the defence minister. In the earlier elections, he portrayed himself as a nationalist and strong figure, although some questioned his mental fitness due to a temper. His image subsequently shifted to a more benign grandfatherly figure, and went so far as to show off dance moves during the most recent campaign which became popular on social media. These images contrasted sharply with those from his 2014 and 2019 campaigns and seemed to allay some of the concerns about human rights violations he had been accused of in the past — allegations that he has long denied.

Initially, Jokowi was thought to support Ganjar Pranowo, the candidate from his ruling Democratic Party – Struggle (PDIP), a former Central Java governor, who has a similar image to himself: a believer in pluralism, engaging, and modest. These are characteristics that would ideally win the hearts of the Indonesian public. According to a survey conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) released in May 2023, however, 81.7% Indonesians were satisfied with Jokowi’s performance as President and from this number, 40% the satisfied respondents would have supported Ganjar with 30% backing Prabowo.

Jokowi eventually threw his support behind his former rival, Prabowo, while the president’s eldest son, Gibran, the mayor of Solo in Central Java, was picked to be the running mate. The Prabowo–Gibran administration is expected to continue Jokowi’s signature mission not yet accomplished: construction of the new capital city, Nusantara, in East Kalimantan. Indeed, Subianto has made no secret that the continuation of Jokowi’s policy is what he intends to do as head of state. The constitutional court chief justice, who coincidentally was Jokowi's brother-in-law, was removed by the ethics panel for allowing the last-minute change in candidacy’s age limit — but the court’s verdict was deemed binding regardless.

The two other contenders decided to challenge the result to the Constitutional Court, citing widespread irregularities. The contenders also challenged the 36-year old Gibran’s inclusion on Prabowo's ticket, claiming that he should have not been allowed. Additionally, the government in the lead-up to the election disbursed a hefty social aid in amount of Rp 496.8 trillion which is almost equal to the social aid being disbursed during the COVID-19 pandemic, Rp 498 trillion, and 12.4% higher than the allocation the previous year at Rp. 493.1 trillion.

The constitutional court on the 22nd of April sealed the victory for Prabowo, rejecting the petitioners’ appeal entirely and ruling there was no evidence of fraud or state intervention that materially shifted the election result. Moreover, the court also found no evidence that Jokowi and his administration bent the laws to support Prabowo.

The dynamics during the campaign season, however, point to a direction of democracy backsliding. It is understood that the rising popularity of Prabowo rooted from Jokowi’s support, as the latter, the first president from outside the Jakarta elite, remains widely popular in the country yet could not run for the third term. Some have argued that Jokowi’s eldest son as a vice president effectively serves as Jokowi’s power by proxy, but the question is that how committed Prabowo, 72 years old, as the role of vice president is often called a “spare" and its influence normally determined by the president.

With what happened during the campaign and election, another question would be how the corruption that remains rampant in the country will affect potential foreign investment? To date, the newly elected administration has yet to offer plans to tackle the issue.

According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Indonesia’s position remains unchanged at 34 and the country's global ranking dropped by five positions to 115th place in 2023, and this issue may pose additional challenges for foreign investors to pursue large-scale opportunities.

Prabowo is also expected to lead a different possible approach in dealing with current regional security challenges.

With the increased tensions in the hydrocarbon-rich South China Sea, the result of the recent presidential election is not only important for the country’s trajectory, but also of interest to both the United States and China. The latter has engaged in aggressive behavior in the region, particularly against the Philippines.

Additionally, Prabowo will be expected to continue the focus on sustaining economic growth, which suggests friendly relations with both the United States and China will be of paramount importance. If so, it is expected that Indonesia will pick no sides or formally align with either major power.

Prabowo will likely continue the popular policy of Jokowi, as he vowed to do during the campaign. His predecessor known to avoid making criticism of either Washington or Beijing, managed to balance defence cooperation with the former and foreign investment with the latter. In his administration, Jokowi managed to score a copious amount of Chinese investment, including a $11.5 billion commitment from one of the world’s largest glass makers, Xinyi, for the construction of a manufacturing plant in the country, and the already popular $7.3 billion high-speed railway, which connects Jakarta and the capital of West Java, Bandung, cutting commute times from four hours to forty minutes.

Not surprisingly, Prabowo paid a visit to China soon after the election, a sign that the bilateral relationship will remain robust.

In recent months, the United States has been increasing its diplomatic activities and engaged in joint military exercises with its allies in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. However, different challenges for the bilateral ties loom for the new government. While Jakarta indicates a desire to engage in more cooperation on joint military exercises, the fallout from the October 7th attack by Hamas on Israel may potentially affect the relationship with Washington. Indonesia has expressed strong support for a Palestinian state, and thanked Spain, Norway and Ireland for extending formal recognition to Palestine. The government also made appeals to European countries for a permanent ceasefire during a ministerial meeting in Brussels. The ongoing war in Gaza, as well as the Biden Administration’s continued, if qualified support for Israel may cast a pall over relations between the two if the fighting continues indefinitely.

Alternatively, an incident from March of this year between China and the Philippines at the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef within the Spratly Islands highlights that concerns remain about China’s aggressive behavior. China claims sovereignty in the area despite a United Nations Convention on the Law and Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal in 2016 finding that China’s claims lacked legal merit. The tribunal also ruled that the Spratly Islands are not islands in a legal sense, rather rocks or low tide elevations. The tensions may be seen as a microcosm of Beijing’s more assertive moves in the South China Sea. Therefore, while currently Sino-Indonesia relations are on good terms, there is no guarantee that disputed South China Sea claims won’t be an issue in the future. One such challenge could bet Beijing’s claims overlapping with Indonesia’s in the gas-rich Natuna Sea area.

It is important to emphasize that the tension in the South China Sea is unlikely to abate anytime soon and the new elected government needs to be cautious while maintaining a delicate balance between the United States and China. Despite ongoing commitments from Washington and Jakarta to cooperate on military matters, unlike with the Philippines, it remains doubtful that Indonesia will join the United States in countering China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea by hosting an American military base in the country. Under successive governments, Indonesia has maintained a free and active foreign policy, non-aligned with any major powers and supports Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) centrality amid the great power rivalry — and is most likely to remain this way.

To be sure, Prabowo’s historical stance showed quite a different picture. In 2019, he was very critical on Chinese investment in Indonesia and said at the time he would review these transactions if elected, as he strongly opposed any foreign influence in Indonesia. In contrast, after joining Jokowi’s administration as the defence minister, his response to the presence of Chinese fishing vessels in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea, a clear sovereignty issue, was rather lacking in firmness.

Prabowo will be sworn into office in October so how his administration will look has yet to be finalized. Whomever he chooses to be in the cabinet will play a very important role for the country’s direction: Indonesia’s role in ASEAN that will indirectly affect its policy towards China amid existing South China Sea tensions, as well as bilateral relations with both the United States and China. Whether Jokowi’s foreign policy practices will carry over and be reinforced will depend on how committed Prabowo is in continuing the policy, as he promised he will.